rehabilitation effort. Nevertheless, scholars are attempting to employ increasingly sophisticated theoretical models in their analyses and increasingly they argue that the recovery process followed a neoliberal orientation that has worsened inequality in New Orleans. 3 In a memoir extremely supportive of former New Orleans mayor C.
Ray Nagin, Edward Blakely casts blame widely for New Orleans' incomplete state of recovery. His introduction spells out his principle points of assessment. Severe infrastructure problems brought New Orleans to "death's door" long before the storm hit. He argues that New Orleans was a "small" city and "impervious to outside" ideas. Moreover, the city's fractious civic and political leadership refused to talk past any old disagreements to allow for real movement forward (p. 4-7) .
Usage of such language did not endear Dr. Blakely to New Orleanians and his critics condemned My Storm. Writers from the New Orleans Times Picayune characterized Blakely as having a "superiority complex" 4 and made light of his many gaffes, including writing that New Orleans was the birthplace of Tina Turner, who was in fact born in Tennessee. 5 Despite these flubs, Blakely's account makes insightful observations. Blakely reveals several warning signs that he witnessed during early unofficial visits in 2005 and 2006, including ill-informed Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) representatives who suspected that New Orleans was too corrupt to control its own recuperation, several competing "official" recovery plans, and recurring racial tensions (p. 18-22) .
Blakeley consistently states that the city lacked any centralized leadership for the recovery. At the outset of his tenure as recovery czar in 2007 Blakely was not briefed on the specifics of his role by the mayor, and he quickly realized his negative position (p. 36) . In addition to his awkward status, Blakely also had to navigate through and unify three competing recovery plans. The Bring New Orleans Back plan used the infamous green dots to indicate zones of depopulation designated to become green space, usually in African American communities. The black community and the city council responded by sponsoring a competing blueprint. Finally, the Greater New Orleans Foundation developed a synthesized plan, which still drew suspicion from the African American community. While the city lost precious time debating the multiple plans, Blakely laments that from a planning standpoint volunteer gutting and rebuilding efforts worsened the central problem: the need for a database systematically indicating conditions by neighborhood (p. 50).
Blakely articulates several arguments regarding the problematic characteristics of pre-Katrina New Orleans. Mayor Nagin, he contends, simply did not possess the management tools to properly deploy his staff for disaster management. Furthermore, Nagin gave neither Blakely nor other members of his staff any directives on how to work together to make relief happen. Surprisingly, Blakely later writes, "He is one of the best bosses I ever had, and my list of bosses is long" (p. 63). Moreover, Blakely writes that the local government was far too structurally fractured to effect positive change (p. 65-71) .
Most significantly, Blakely argues that "the New Orleans' recovery was largely about the politics of money and who controlled it: city or state, black or white, rich or poor, downtown or neighborhoods" (p. 76).
He contends that the state ineffectively micromanaged the distribution of federal recovery funds to New Orleans (p. 77). He also argues that neither the private sector nor non-for-profit groups were the appropriate vehicles for recovery. In the case of the former, there is too much motivation for profit and in the latter too much potential for corrupted leadership (p. 80).
Blakely outlines a set of comprehensive suggestions for rehabilitating the city. He maintains that a more holistic approach than fixing levees should be enacted-a position he holds consistently throughout the book. Instead of trying to hold the water back, the city needs to develop plans for more effective waterflow, to use tax incentives move citizens to less flood prone areas in the north and east of the city, and to invest heavily in wetlands restoration. Similar lapses in articulating key arguments occur throughout the introduction. Bourbonism, for example, is one of its key theoretical constructs, but it is imprecisely explained. Woods briefly tells the reader that Bourbonism originated out of political analyses of pre-Revolutionary France and has subsequently been applied to analyses of ruling regimes in the South. He then argues that Bourbonism/Neo-Bourbonism/ Neoliberalism (terms he seems to use interchangeably) grew in parallel with what he calls the Blues tradition whose "principle concern is not the The media has rarely questioned the concept and it has generally functioned well to deflect government accountability in crisis moments.
During Katrina, however, the press interrogated the government's contention that Katrina outstripped their ability to react appropriately.
Faced with this challenge, the tipping point narrative collapsed, but proponents of neoliberalism resorted to arguments regarding personal responsibility, restoration of law and order, and the need for private organizations to fill the gaps left by government (p. 26).
Several essays move from the crisis itself to consideration of New
Orleans as an urban environment after the storm. Adrienne Dixon uses critical race theory for example, to argue that the emerging hybrid school model in New Orleans (charter, public, and private) restricts educational opportunities. First she notes that critical race theory focuses on the conditions of inequality instead of on the mere opportunity to gain equality through process (p. 131, 132) . Using this theoretical frame it becomes clear that while the expansion of charter schools in New Orleans represents more opportunities for parents on paper, in reality it has led to a reduction in workers' right for teachers and a limited accessibility to the best schools by the city's poorest parents (p. 144-146) . Here Arena notes the beginning of the transformation of community leaders and their strategies. Reflecting a national pattern, tenant leaders began to espouse notions of "self-help." This meant moving away from older demands on government to empowering tenants to be responsible for the maintenance of public housing (p. 61).
Unfortunately Arena does not use his oral testimonies to deeply explore the motivations of individual groups and leaders to transform their organizational model and reorient their relationships to the political apparatus (local political leaders and foundations). Instead, Arena uses conspiratorial and petty language to describe STRC's shift to the nonprofit model. He points to a move towards the language of self-help that grew nationally through the spread of neoliberal ideology. In so doing the proponents of neoliberalism become part of an evil cabal, duping groups like the STRC into following a philosophy that violated their own interests. He describes, for example, a Washington D.C. tenant activist Kimi Gray who strongly influenced the STRC's transformation, as being "trotted out" as a "showpiece" for self-help. (p. 58). This sort of language unnecessary, for Arena has more than enough evidence demonstrating that STRC's non-profit status begins a series of compromises with local authorities and real estate interests that moved them away from their successful confrontational origins to the political mainstream.
Arena contends that the national and local governments-President 
